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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY	EAST GERMANY/WARSAW	PACT				
DATE OF	1976		I	DATE 31	January	1979
		SUBJECT				

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: The Experience of Conducting Integrated Checks of Combat Readiness in the People's Navy

SOURCE Documentary

## Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by Rear Admiral G. Hesse, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the East German Navy. It is a synopsis of how the East German navy does the combat readiness evaluation of a unit. It lists the objectives, describes the general procedure, and offers some techniques that have been found effective in improving the quality of these evaluations, or checks, as the article calls them. This article appeared in Issue No. 12, which was published in 1976.

End of Summary

Comment
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Rear Admiral Gustav Hesse has been Chief of Staff of the East German Navy since 1971.

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## The Experience of Conducting Integrated Checks of Combat Readiness in the People's Navy

by

Rear Admiral G. Hesse,
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff,
People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic

The effective defense of socialism requires that all branches of the armed forces of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, including the People's Navy, maintain constant combat readiness and the capability of quickly bringing their forces to a higher level of readiness.

Speaking to activists of army Party organizations, the Minister of Defense of the German Democratic Republic, General of the Army Heinz HOFFMANN stressed that combat readiness means that state of the control organs and troops which at any time under complex situational conditions ensures the repulse of an aggressor's strikes and enables groupings of our forces, by delivering crushing strikes against the enemy, to successfully develop subsequent combat actions.

The state of combat readiness, as is known, is characterized by a large number of ideological-political, military, and military-technical factors. It seems to us that this array of factors must find its expression in the manner of checking combat readiness. Obviously, in the course of a check, it is necessary to determine the degree to which the control organs and troops of the large unit or unit being checked are ready to carry out the assigned tasks within the set times under conditions close to those of combat, and to determine the degree to which they are prepared to achieve victory in present-day warfare. This means, in our view, that in the course of such a check, along with other things, the following elements must be evaluated:

- the political, moral, psychological, and physical training of all the personnel for war, their readiness to carry out the tasks confronting them, and the state of military discipline and order;

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- the availability of prepared command posts and the ability of the commanders and staffs to exercise continuous troop control:
- the organization of the transition of forces to a higher level of combat readiness, and the fulfilment of the norms established by guideline documents;

- the level of strength in personnel, weapons, and

equipment;

- the status of the weapons and combat equipment, and the maintenance of the prescribed technical readiness factors for ships and weapons;
- the availability and condition of materiel and technical reserves;

- the level of operational-tactical, tactical, and combat training.

Special attention in the preparation and conduct of an integrated check of combat readiness is given to ensuring its surprise nature, allowing no oversimplifications, keeping to a minimum restrictions on the actions of forces when they go over to full combat readiness, and seeing to it that the control organs and troops are assigned realistic operational-tactical and combat tasks which correspond to the specific situational conditions.

In summing up the results of such checks, the main goal is to determine measures aimed at the further increase of combat readiness and, particularly, to come up with conclusions and proposals with respect to the following matters:

- the further improvement of the political and military training and indoctrination of the personnel;

- the improvement of the organizational bases needed to

bring the forces to higher levels of combat readiness;

- the continuous reduction of the time norms established for bringing the forces to higher levels of combat readiness (placement of personnel on combat alert, notification and assembling of personnel, full supplying of ships and boats with combat means, dispersal and preliminary deployment of forces) and the working out and employment of new methods for the combat use of ships and boats, weapons, and combat equipment.

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We endeavor to organize checks in a way that they become for the troops being checked and for each serviceman in the People's Navy guideposts in the matter of the further increase of combat readiness. In accordance with this goal, a graphic outline of the check is drawn up in advance on a nautical chart, along with a legend. It includes the theme, goal, and time of the check, as well as its stages and the main support problems and measures. The outline is approved by the Deputy Minister of National Defense/Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic. A plan is then worked out for the conduct of the check, which reflects the specific course of actions to be taken by the forces participating in it, as well as a list of the hypothetical situations and events.

From the point of view of drawing up the plan, our experience confirms that it is most expedient, in accordance with the outline of the check, to depict graphically on charts the tasks to be accomplished and the time and place of the actions.

In the course of the check of combat readiness, tasks are assigned to the forces in the form of combat orders and instructions in accordance with the main principles of the combat employment of the branch arms of the naval forces and with conditions approximating an actual situation.

To maintain secrecy, the complete content of the check is given to a limited circle of officers; the others are admitted to the development of only individual matters in the plan, which they prepare in the form of variants. They are not informed of the times of the check.

In recent years, for a greater in-depth check of combat readiness, the naval staff has coordinated support matters in advance with the branches of the armed forces of the National People's Army and the allied fleets in the Baltic Sea. For example, the Navy of the Polish People's Republic has allocated submarines and naval aviation to represent the enemy; these have ensured a check of the forces of the People's Navy that contains the element of surprise and approximates real conditions.

It would be desirable in the future to coordinate in advance mutual support measures for checks of combat readiness and to draw on the necessary forces and means.

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In the preparation and conduct of checks of combat readiness, a simultaneous check of combat and mobilization readiness is, in our opinion, of great importance. The point is that in this instance it is possible to get a real picture of the readiness and capability of the control organs and troops to go over to a wartime structure and to conduct combat actions.

Taken into consideration here should be the fact that it is not always possible to conduct a check of mobilization readiness with the involvement of reservists and technical means from the national economy. Therefore, provision has to be made for alternative variants that approximate the real ones, for example, the use of active-duty personnel of other subunits to represent certain mobilization resources.

In other instances, for the check of reception points, the personnel and equipment of the subunits being checked have been used to represent "reservists and equipment."

The experience of checks that have been conducted shows that the smaller the number of restrictions on the actions of the forces and control organs in going over to increased levels of readiness, the greater the possibilities for thoroughly discovering the actual preparedness of the large units being checked.

The combat readiness check connected with the carrying out of mobilization measures and performance of combat tasks has proved to be an important form of evaluating the capability of the control organs and the fleet forces to accomplish their characteristic tasks under real conditions. Establishing complex situational conditions and building up the situation in the course of the checks have required the commanders and staffs to react immediately to changes in the situation and make sound decisions.

By analyzing the results of the checks, we have found possible ways of reducing the times involved in signalling an alert, notifying and assembling personnel, dispersing forces, and conducting other measures to bring forces to higher levels of readiness.

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Having a substantial effect on the combat readiness of ships is the maintenance of a high and stable technical readiness factor for ships, weapons, and technical means. These matters are given the closest attention in the People's Navy.

The goal of all measures when checks of combat readiness are conducted is, in the final analysis, to develop among personnel the capability of carrying out complex combat tasks and effectively employing their weapons in the shortest period of time and under any situational conditions.

Of great importance for the successful conduct of such checks has been the allocation of monitoring groups or officer monitors to the large units and units being checked. Their composition and preparedness must be such as to ensure an integrated evaluation of actions when the fleet forces go over to higher levels of combat readiness and an evaluation of combat task performance and all-round support.


The admirals and officers making up the monitoring groups must be able to evaluate realistically the control organs and the fleet forces being checked; for this they must have good specialized knowledge.

Also proving to be a positive factor has been the use of tables listing the main time norms for the execution of measures to bring the forces to increased readiness. A record of the times attained by the large unit, unit, or their subunits being checked and a comparision of the target and actual results make it possible to draw the necessary conclusions.

It is helpful to use previously prepared forms for the monitoring groups to report on the results of the check. They make it possible to depict graphically the necessary data for a thorough analysis of the results of the check of combat readiness and do not require the preparation of voluminous reports.

To analyze and evaluate the indices achieved, it is good to designate a critique group. Its task is to work out an overall evaluation of the state of combat and mobilization readiness while the check is still going on, based on the stage-by-stage reports presented by the monitoring groups. Here, in our view, it is particularly important to draw the proper conclusions

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directed towards further improvement of the combat readiness of the large unit or unit being checked, as well as of the fleet as a whole.

It has proved to be expedient in the analysis of check measures that, after each measure is carried out, the directors of the monitoring groups or the monitoring officers submit their written reports in the form of prepared report forms and norm tables to the critique group and in this way contribute to a reduction of the preparation period for the critique.

The director of the check also hears reports at the conclusion of each stage of the check.

All these measures make it possible to perform a comprehensive and realistic analysis and evaluate actions within a brief period of time, and they contribute to obtaining a realistic picture of the state of the combat and mobilization readiness of the large unit or unit that has been checked.

The critique of the results of the check is carried out through the hearing of oral reports of the monitoring groups by the director of the check in the presence of the commander and deputy commanders of the large unit or unit being checked, with subsequent approval of the reports.

In another instance, an overall evaluation of the state of the combat and mobilization readiness of the large unit being checked is given in a report by the director of the check before the responsible commanders and officers of the particular large unit and of other large units of the fleet. This form of analysis is particularly effective, since it makes it possible to convey the acquired experience quickly to the large units of the fleet; however, it is not always suitable because of secrecy considerations.

In both instances, a written report on the results of the check is drawn up. The report sets forth the conclusions that will be used in improving the combat readiness of the fleet, and determines the tasks directed at eliminating the shortcomings found.

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In conclusion, we believe that it constant search for new ways of improvenecks is a necessary condition for in readiness of the fleet forces. Hence, increasing the integrated nature of the advisable at the present time:	ring the existing system of acreasing the combat in the interests of
- to further improve the coordinathe checks of the combat readiness amourmed forces of the National People's in the Baltic Sea; - to carry out checks of combat r	ang the branches of the Army and the allied fleets readiness simultaneously in
the large units, units, and rear servi constantly improve the methodology of	ces installations and to
We are convinced that such measur check thoroughly the cooperation of mu combat actions and the problems of mut the consistent improvement of the comb People's Navy.	ultiple-arm forces in joint ual support, thus promoting
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